Conflict Reader

Photo Source: Al Jazeera

Despite a decent election, there are challenges in converting it into an irreversible democratic process. Internal politics and external interest are chief among them and, not the threat posed by the Taliban.

Conflict Reader # 75, 1 October 2019

Afghan Elections
The Afghans are in for a long haul; so should the rest of us

CR Analysis

D. Suba Chandran
Professor
International Strategic and Security Studies Programme (ISSSP)
National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bangalore

Contrary to the expectations, the election in Afghanistan, that got over this Saturday was not that violent. Certainly not on Afghan standard. Despite the open threat from the Taliban against participation, the Afghans did queue up and vote. The turnout may have been lower, but that should not reduce the success of Saturday’s election. 

Again, diverging from popular expectations, the Afghan forces were able to provide security to the polling booths, though the numbers have been greatly reduced when compared to the last elections. The polling booths may have been lesser in number (more than 450 stations have to be closed) but the Taliban could not affect the polling process of those booths that remained open.

Despite criticisms, the Afghan Election Commission, given their limited experience and exposure in organizing elections, have done a decent job. Of course, there were complaints of missing names and lack of stationaries, that should not take the credit from the Commission for an incredible job, given its inherent limitations.

The Afghans have spoken and have made a point, cutting across the ethnic and provincial boundaries. Now the government has to respond – not just to the mandate, but also the spirit behind the same. Now, the rest of the world should stay the course, instead of packing and leaving. 

Post-elections 2019 is the time for an intense interaction in Afghanistan and ensure that internal and international investments so far in Afghanistan are not wasted. 

How does the balance sheet on democracy in Afghanistan look like at the end of September 2019 after the election? What are the immediate challenges in converting a relatively successful election into an irreversible democratic process?
 

Making history with four elections in a row

For the first time in the history of Afghanistan, the country has witnessed four elections in a row. This election was delayed – partially because of the violence, but also equally due to the US-Taliban dialogue. There was an expectation that there would be a deal with the Taliban and a belief that holding the elections after it would be useful. 

Four elections in a row in fifteen years is a historic achievement, which the critics of Afghan democracy fail to understand. What is happening in the country is ahistoric. Never before was a democratic process like this in Afghanistan, however flawed.

The credit should go to the Afghans, especially those who went out and voted despite the threats. They perhaps showed a finger to the ink, and the other one to those who have doubted their sincerity and commitment to a democratic Afghanistan. 

Despite the threat of violence, accusations of corruption and failure of governance, there is a new Afghan spirit that is strongly emerging. 

 

Immediate Challenges are political and not Taliban

The immediate challenge post-election results - is government formation. Much would depend on the nature of the result and its acceptance by those who have come second and third.

During the previous election in 2014, there were no clear winners – between Abdul Ghani and – Abdullah Abdullah. After an initial hiccup and a second count, both have agreed (and forced by the rest of the international community) to share power for the next five years. And they did – with Ghani as the President, and Abdullah as the Chief Executive. They should be congratulated for maintaining a united government. 

There were and still are deep differences between the two. Ghani was seen as an American plant; Abdullah was closer to Ahmed Shah Massoud. The former had an American passport while the latter never stayed outside for a prolonged period. Will these two leaders work together again, even if the mandate is clear? 

Worse, what if the mandate is not upright and there is no clear majority? Abdullah camp has already complained about the closure of booths and ballot stuffing. If there is no clear winner in the first round securing 51 per cent of the votes polled (which is likely to be), there would be a second round, as happened in 2014. The second count is likely, but that should not be allowed to open the floodgates.

Besides the two, there is also Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Despite his recent credentials as a democratic who is willing to take part in the elections, none can deny his history and warlord background. His role in destabilizing Afghanistan since the 1990s is no less when compared to the Taliban. How will he respond after the election results? He would divide Ghani’s vote share and make the process difficult. His demands in post-government formation would be another issue.

Much would depend on how Ghani and Abdullah respond to the situation when there is a second vote. This will be a greater challenge to Afghanistan, than dealing with the Taliban.

 

The exaggerated threat of the Taliban 

28 September should be a historic day for contemporary Afghanistan. Taliban may find ways to infiltrate Kabul, and suicide bomb marriages and, ambush security installations, but it is not powerful enough to bring down Afghanistan on its knees, on a given day.

It may still succeed in conducting guerilla warfare and destabilize the daily activities. Does this not convey something about the notion of Taliban’s invincibility?

The West, especially the US should realise that had it not been for an external backer, the Taliban would not have come to power on its own. Terrorist organizations like the Hizbul Mujahideen in J&K, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka arose but subsequently fell. The reason was simple, the national government pursued a tough strategy towards these militant groups, and the international community did not intervene and enter into a dialogue without the approval of the national government. Norway tried to, but failed in Sri Lanka. Terrorist groups have to be neutralized or forced militarily to come over the ground, but not dialogue with.

The US dialogue with the Taliban has been a folly since the beginning. If at all, it should have been left to the Afghan government in Kabul than holding it in Doha. 

Despite criticisms and failures, the Afghan security forces have shown remarkable resilience and have supported the Election Commission to go ahead with the electoral process. Taliban is not invincible. It is a long haul and let the Afghan security forces do their job. Give them time!

 

Strengthen the Institutions

The critics would still find faults with the electoral process that has just finished its second leg in conducting the election, after finalizing the entire pre-election processes. The third one – counting and announcing may be challenging as well. The Election Commission now should find its feet and courage to complete the political process in ensuring a transfer, whether smooth or otherwise

Elections in South Asia are not an easy job. Even in experienced democracies like India, the Election Commission comes under criticisms and scrutiny. In India’s case, the long experience since 1947, independence of the institution and, the support from Judiciary has helped it grow tremendously. Given the short history, lack of experience, manpower and training, the Election Commission of Afghanistan has done a tremendous job. 

The role of institutions becomes important in this context. Post-elections, the government has to emphasis on building institutions that would stand up and deliver as the Election Commission has done. 

The international community should continue to invest in building these democratic institutions. Afghanistan cannot be built in two decades. The Afghans are in for a long haul; so should the rest of us be.
 

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